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This thesis studies a perfect information bilateral bargaining game, in which the 
negotiating parties hold heterogeneous prior beliefs on the eventual resolution of un-
certainty. Specifically, when two parties are negotiating over a periodic surplus, they 
may seek for external support from a common third party. Moreover, it often takes 
a while for the third party to have the final decision about which side to support. 
Before the third party makes his final decision, both negotiating parties insist on 
his subjective belief about who will receive the support eventually and believe that 
his opponent is optimistic. The bargaining game described above has an essentially 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Under certain circumstance, an agree-
ment will be delayed until the uncertainty is resolved. The expected efficiency loss 
remains substantial even when the negotiating parties become extremely patient. 
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1 Introduction 
When there is a dispute between two parties, a common third party may come in and 
do something to interfere with the negotiation in order to resolve the conflict. This 
third party could be an mediator, who divides the surplus according to the offers 
being made and rejected in the past history and the preferences of the negotiating 
parties. He could also be a biased party, who may affirm his support to one of the 
negotiating party only during the whole bargaining process. In this thesis, we are 
interested in the situation in which there is a third party who may come in and 
support one of the negotiating party thereafter. However, it often takes a while 
before the third party finally affirms his stand in the dispute. This bargaining model 
could capture many circumstances in the real life. For example, when there is a 
conflict between two countries, the United Nation (UN) may come in and exert his 
support to one of the countries. However, the UN could affirm his stand only after 
voting process of his member countries. It is usually the case that a long process 
has to elapse before having the final decision. The situation is similar whenever two 
member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have a trade dispute. 
The WTO may support one of the country to take action against the other country. 
Moreover, it often takes a long time before the WTO makes his final judgement on 
which side to support. The negotiation between the employer and employee can also 
fit into this model. The government may come in and support one of the parties in 
case the conflict is not resolved even after a long time. All these bargaining situations 
involve the third party, the negotiating parties would like to have the support of the 
third party on his side. If the third party comes in and expresses his support to 
one of the parties, the game could end immediately. Another feature in these daily 
bargaining situations is that both negotiating parties may hold excessively optimistic 
subjective belief about having the support from the third party on his side eventually. 
When the level of optimism is significant, the two negotiating parties cannot reach 
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any agreement until the third party comes in and has affirmed his support to one 
of the negotiating party. This will cause delay in reaching the final agreement. The 
delay is usually costly to both parties. 
We provide a stylized model to capture the bargaining situation described above. 
Basically, our model follows the work of Yildiz (2003). Both models incorporate 
players' optimism into the basic bilateral bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982). 
Moreover, we have different interpretation on the meaning for optimism. Yildiz intro-
duces random proposer into Rubinstein's bilateral bargaining situation and assumes 
that both negotiating parties hold heterogeneous prior beliefs on the probability of 
being recognized as a proposer. Both players insist on his subjective belief about 
the recognition process and believe that another player is optimistic. In contrast, 
we keep the alternative bargaining procedure in Rubinstein's model and introduce a 
third party into the basic model. We assume that both players hold heterogeneous 
prior beliefs about receiving the support from this third party. Being optimistic, 
we mean that each player believes that the third party will support him and his 
future disagreement payoff will increase while that of his opponent remains the same 
throughout the whole bargaining process. With this straightforward model, we man-
age to obtain either immediate agreement or equilibrium with delay depending on 
the parameters in the model. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that our 
contribution to the literature is not to provide new insights in explaining the role of 
optimism in bargaining. Our main contribution is to build up a simpler and more 
intuitive model to re-examine the important insights of Yildiz and show that his Im-
mediate Agreement Theorem is robust to our definition of optimism. In addition, we 
characterize the explicit form for the equilibrium payoffs and specify a necessary and 
sufficient condition for delay to occur, by using the technique in Shaked and Sutton 
(1984). Furthermore, we approximate the upper bound for the expected efficiency 
loss due to the collective optimism of the negotiating parties. This efficiency loss 
does not disappear even though the negotiating parties become extremely patient. 
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This suggests that optimism can explain inefficient bargaining behavior to some ex-
tent. In the remaining of this section, we provide the intuitive explanations for the 
results obtained. 
First of all, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence 
of the perfect equilibrium with delay. Mathematically, we write the delay condi-
tion as pd{qi + q2 — l) > (1 - (^ ) /J, where p is the probability for the realization 
of the random event E, d is the support from the third party and qi is player i's 
belief about the probability for receiving the support from the third party. When 
pd^qi + 仍—1) > (1 — 5) /5, agreement with delay is the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome. Players agree immediately right after the resolving of the 
uncertainty. On the contrary, when pd{qi + - 1) < (1 - <5)/J, players agree im-
mediately.^  Prom the above two conditions, whether the players prefer waiting to 
immediate agreement depends not only on the expected duration of the excessive 
optimism, but also on the level of optimism.。The shorter the expected duration for 
the persistence of uncertainty and the higher the level of optimism, the less likely for 
the players to agree immediately. Intuitively, we can interpret Spdqi as the expected 
discount support for the third party on his side. Then 5pd (仍 + — 1) can be inter-
preted as the expected perceived surplus generated by the collective optimism of the 
players for delaying the game to next period. Moreover, the discounted value of the 
original pie is 5 only with one period of delay. The loss for delaying the agreement 
to the next period is 1 — J. Players make the decision by comparing the perceived 
gain and loss for delaying the game. They are willing to delay the game to next 
period only if the expected surplus for waiting is greater than that of the of loss. 
The rationale for waiting is to receive the perceived benefits generated by collective 
optimism. Moreover, the expected perceived future benefits are increasing with the 
iWe ignore the trivial case that pd {qi + 92 - 1) = (1 - /5 
2 Base on our model, we can show that the expected duration for the persistence of optimism is 
1/p. In addition, the level of optimism is defined to be d{qi + 92 — 1), which is also the perceived 
benefit generated by collective optimism. 
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parameters p.d and qi. Then the players will be more willing to wait for the future 
benefits as these parameters become higher. Otherwise, they will have immediate 
agreement even though they are collectively optimistic about the future increase in 
the disagreement payoff on his favour. 
From delay condition, we can look into the Immediate Agreement Theorem of 
Yildiz (2003). The delay condition will be violated for sufficient small p even though 
players may remain optimistic through time. That is when the expected duration of 
the optimism is sufficiently long, players agree immediately for any level of optimism. 
This is consistent with Yildiz's Immediate Agreement Theorem. Our result confirms 
his important sight about the role of optimism in bargaining. Nevertheless, we are 
also keen on other side of the story. For every not very small p, the optimism is 
expected to be not very persistent, the players cannot agree on any division of the 
surplus when the level of optimism is sufficiently high. Instead, they would rather 
wait until the resolving of uncertainty. Optimism can then cause inefficient delay 
when it is not so persistent. Therefore, optimism does have a certain explaining 
power for inefficient bargaining behavior. 
More importantly, we find that the expected maximum efficiency loss caused by 
optimism does not become negligible even when the players become more and more 
patient. In fact, the expected maximum efficiency loss in the bargaining game is an 
increasing function of discount factor. Further, it converges to a positive value that 
depends solely on the magnitude of the collective optimism. Particularly, the limit 
for the expected loss can be approximately estimated by + g2 — 1) d, which is by 
definition the level of collective optimism. The interpretation is that the increase 
in discount factor provides a higher incentive for the players to wait for the future 
support of the third party and increases the probability of having agreement with 
delay. Since both players expect the future support of the third party on his favour, 
they are willing to wait for the realization of the support as long as this expected 
future support is sufficiently large. Moreover, the whole pie is shrinking through 
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time. This provides a counter active force to discourage the negotiating parties to 
wait indefinitely. Then the efficiency loss in the bargaining game will not increase 
without limit. The maximum loss for waiting is the perceived surplus generated 
by the collective optimism of the players. This perceived surplus in excess of the 
support from the third party is dissipated by the waiting behavior of the negotiating 
parties. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as the follows. In the next section, we review 
the literatures. In section 3，we lay out our formal model. In section 4, we specify 
the necessary and sufficient condition for delay to occur and characterize the perfect 
equilibrium with delay. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium achieved in 
the first period of the game in section 5. Section 6 analyzes the expected efficiency 
loss generated by collective optimism. Brief discussion about the results and their 
implication on the Immediate Agreement Theorem are given in section 7. Section 8 
concludes the thesis. 
5 
2 Literature Review 
Even though bargaining situation is one of the most basic human situations in the 
daily life, it has not attracted a lot of attentions from economists until the seminal 
works of Nash (1950,1953). In his influential paper in 1950, Nash defines the bargain-
ing problem formally and introduces four axioms to determine the unique solution. 
This is the axiomatic approach for bargaining. The bargaining solution is determined 
automatically as long as the appropriate axioms are defined. Nash (1953) constructs 
a Nash demand game and obtain the same solution as it is defined by the four ax-
ioms in his previous paper. This finding reinforces the result in his previous paper 
and provides some justifications for the using of the four axioms to determine the 
bargaining solution. This is the first attempt to provide non-cooperative foundation 
for the Nash bargaining problem. 
Another breakthrough in bargaining theory is due to Rubinstein (1982) who mod-
els the bargaining process explicitly. In this bargaining framework, two players take 
turns to be offerer and responder. The game terminates whenever the new offer is 
accepted or there is perpetual disagreement. If there is an agreement on the division 
of the pie, players obtain the agreed share. If there is perpetual disagreement, both 
players have 0 payoff. He shows that the bargaining game has a perfect equilibrium 
attained in the first period. In addition, he specifies the explicit form of the equi-
librium outcome for the bargaining game with exponential discounting. This is the 
most frequently cited result. Later, Shaked and Sutton (1984) find a more intuitive 
and simpler proof by using backward induction and isomorphic structure of the game. 
This method becomes a popular technique on solving of the bargaining games in the 
past twenty years. Sutton (1986) illustrates the using of this technique to solve two 
simple bargaining games. We use this technique extensively in this thesis. 
The unique efficient equilibrium outcome in the Nash bargaining model and Ru-
binstein bilateral bargaining model is appealing in term of modelling. Moreover, it 
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is often the case that the final agreement is reached only after long confrontation. In 
other words, delay in reaching agreement has not been captured in these two models. 
Moreover, the Rubinstein bargaining framework could be easily modified to capture 
this aspect in real life. 
The early literatures suggest incomplete information as an explanation for the 
inefficiency behavior in bargaining. The basic idea under this line of models is to 
consider delay as a device to convey private information. Rubinstein (1985) con-
siders the basic bilateral bargaining model with the assumption that players have 
incomplete information about the time preference of their opponent. He manages to 
refine a unique sequential equilibrium from a large set of equilibrium outcome. In 
equilibrium, the strong type player may delay the game to convey the information 
that he is the strong type. Admati and Perry (1987) consider a similar situation 
except that each responder has the option to delay the response as long as he wishes 
after a certain time. In equilibrium, the strong type players have the strategy to 
delay the game to obtain more surplus while the weak type players can pretend to 
be strong type and delay the game. The delay in the game remains significant even 
though the offer becomes extremely frequent. Cramton (1992) reinforces this result 
by introducing two sided uncertainty into the bargaining game. Abreu and Gul 
(2000) introduce irrational type player, who always have fixed offer and acceptance 
rule, into the model. They analyze the war of attrition type bargaining game and 
emphasize on the reputation effect. The unique sequential equilibrium is that some 
players delay the game by mimicking irrational type players. The driving force in 
the delay tactic is to build up the reputation that he is the irrational type player. 
Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which 
the seller asks for a price and buyer decides whether to accept or reject the current 
offer. In the bargaining game, it is assumed that the buyer has private information 
about the value of the object while the seller has private information about his be-
liefs about the buyer's valuation. They show that this second order rationality can 
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cause delay in equilibrium. The delay does not vanish even the offers become more 
frequent. 
The more recent papers propose stochastic bargaining model and bargaining with 
behavioral biased as a possible cause of delay. Avery and Zemsky (1994) analyze the 
basic Rubinstein bargaining situation with shock to change the bargaining set after 
the offer is made and before the response. With this modification, the responder can 
actually consider the offer as another option that can be taken. Delay may be resulted 
in this model if the expected positive shock is sufficient large. We have a similar 
interpretation on the option value. We consider optimism as another option that 
can be taken by the agents. Furuswa and Wen (2002) study a bargaining model with 
stochastic disagreement payoffs. There will be delay in the game if the disagreement 
payoff is sufficient large. They show that when players are allowed to postpone 
making an offer without losing the right to propose in the following period, the 
equilibrium involves inefficient delay in some cases. We also analyze the bargaining 
model with stochastic disagreement payoffs. Moreover, our model different from 
Furuswa and Wen (2002). They assume that the both players' disagreement payoffs 
are the same and follow Bernoulli distribution with realized value 0 or o? at the 
beginning of each period. On the contrary, we assume that the disagreement payoff 
of one of the negotiating parties has certain probability to change to d in the new 
period as long as the change is not realized before. Once the change is realized, 
the disagreement payoff remain the same thereafter. In addition, we assume the 
heterogeneous prior belief instead of the common prior belief used in their model. 
For the bargaining game with behavioral biased, there are some literatures on 
experimental economics. Neale and Bazerman (1989) conduct experiment to show 
that overconfidence causes less concession and reduces the successful negotiation. 
Moreover, realistic confident increase the probability of concession and agreement. 
Babcock (1995) shows that player is confident about the uncertainty being resolved in 
his favour. This biased judgement may cause impasse in the bargaining. Babcock and 
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Loewenstein (1997) illustrates that self-serving biases is an explanation for bargaining 
impasse. All these literatures provide some justifications to show that there is a 
relationship between optimism and bargaining impasses. Moreover, there is limited 
theoretical model to show the role of optimism in bargaining. Yildiz (2003,2004) is 
the first to conduct full-fledged game theoretic analysis of the role of optimism in 
bargaining. He assumes that every player has a positive probability to be recognized 
as a proposer at the beginning of each period and being recognized is the only 
source of bargaining power. Players have different beliefs on the recognition process. 
Optimism in his model is in term of players' optimistic belief about his probability 
of being recognized. He introduces the measurement for the level of optimism as 
1^ + ^ 2-1 where qi is play i,s belief on the probability that he is recognized as a 
proposer. Yildiz (2003) analyzes a model without learning. Surprisingly, he shows 
that there will be immediate agreement if the players remain optimistic for sufficient 
long period of time. In the companion paper, Yildiz (2004) extends the model with 
the addition of Bayesian learning for players in his probability of being recognized. 
He shows that inefficient delay is possible when the players are allowed to update 
their belief. Each player actually waits to persuade the other player that his belief 
is correct. Ali (2006) extends Yildiz's work into multilateral bargaining. He shows 
that the Immediate Agreement Theorem of Yildiz (2003) could not be extended 
to multilateral bargaining directly. The Immediate Agreement Theorem held only 
when there is moderate optimism and fail if agents have extremely optimism. He also 
obtains short delay in a high unstable equilibrium path. This delay will converge 
to 0 if the time difference between offers tends to 0. We also analyze the role of 
optimism to the equilibrium behavior of the agents. Moreover, we assume that the 
agents hold optimistic belief on the change in disagreement payoffs rather than the 
probability of recognition. 
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3 Basic Model 
We analyze a perfect information game with optimism. The basic bargaining envi-
ronment is Rubinstein's bilateral alternative bargaining model. Two players 1 and 2, 
bargain over an allocation of a periodic surp W® normalized to 1 according to infinite 
alternating offers procedure. An agreement is a vector a = (oi, a2)，in which a^  is the 
share of player i. The set of all feasible agreement is A= {a e [0，if : ai + a2 <l}. 
An agreement can be reached in period t e T = {0,1,2...}. For notational sim-
plicity, we suppose the player makes offer s G [0，1] on the partition of the pie. We 
interpret s as the proportion of the pie that player 1 receives (player 2 receives 1 — s). 
During the whole bargaining game, players receive interim disagreement payoffs 
in every period whenever an agreement has not been reached. Without loss of gen-
erality, the initial disagreement payoffs for both players are normalized to 0. The 
game terminates either the new offer is accepted or there is perpetual disagreement. 
At the beginning of the periods, one of the players, the proposer, makes an offer to 
share the value of 1 from the period onward. The other player, the responder, has the 
option to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the game ends and each 
player enjoys the constant stream of the agreed share. If the offer is rejected, each 
player collects his disagreement payoff and the nature will then move. The nature 
determines the occurrence of a random event E, which may happen only once at the 
beginning of any period and before the new offer is made. If the event E is not 
realized, the disagreement payoff vector remain at 0 and the bargaining game pro-
ceeds as before. If the event E is realized, a third party gets involved immediately.^ 
The third party will exert his support to one of the negotiating parties thereafter. 
3 By periodic surplus, we mean that there is a new pie arriving at the beginning of every new 
period. Mathematical, this is equivalent to the situation in which there is only one pie, which 
is shrinking through time due the the impatience of the players. Moreover the interpretation is 
different in these two situations. 
'^ The third party is intrduced as a part of the bargaining environment only. It is not involved 
in the strategic interaction of the players. The bargaining game is then remain bilateral. 
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The support comes in the form of an interim disagreement payoffs of d e (0，1).^  
The uncertainty of this bargaining game may come from two sources. One is that 
when the third party will enter the game. In our setting, if the third party has not 
entered the game in the past history, he may enter the game at the beginning of next 
period with positive possibility whenever disagreement occurs in the current period. 
The exact time for which the third party to enter the game is then indeterministic. 
There is always a positive probability that the third party enter the game only after 
a long period of time. This indeterministic duration for the persistence of this kind 
of uncertainty is a notable feature of our model. The other source of uncertainty 
is that which side the third party will offer his support. Each negotiating party i 
believes that with probability qi 6 (0,1), the third party will take his side. 
Specifically, we assume the realization of the random event E obeys a stationary 
distribution. If it has not happened by period t, with probability p E (0,1), it 
will happen at the beginning of period i + 1 and before the new offer is made/' The 
occurrence of the random event then follows a geometric distribution with parameter 
p. The expected duration for the persistence of uncertainties is I/p. The negotiating 
parties share common belief on this probability for the realization of E and agree 
that the third party will decide which party to support immediately after his entry. 
In addition, the decision of third party is made once and will not change after the 
decision. By convention, we assume that player 1 is the first mover in the game.' 
Base on the above description of the bargaining game, we depict the first three 
periods of the bargaining game in figure 1. We will clarify the notation G^ (0:1,2:2) 
appeared in figure 1 at the end of this section. 
5 We assume that d e (0’ 1). Otherwise mutual gain from cooperation is not possible. 
6 This assumption on the the probability for realisation of random event E is equivalent to the 
assumption on the probability for the third party to enter the game. It is because the third party 
will enter the game immediately after the realisation of E, 
7 Of course, we may assume other form of recognition process, but the main results remain. 
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Figure 1: Game Tree Represents First Three Periods of the Bargaining Game 
For simplicity, we assume that the two players are risk neutral and have a common 
discount factor 5 E (0,1). We can then determine the payoffs of the negotiating 
party by different timing of the agreement and the entry of the third party. We 
categorize the outcomes of the bargaining game into five types and specify the payoff 
accordingly:^ 
I Agreement (01,02) is reached in period t and the third party has not yet entered 
by that period. The payoff vector is ((5、i’(5、2) • 
II Agreement (01,02) is reached in period t immediately after the third party's 
entry in the same period. The payoff vector is also ( “ 1 ’ 
Ill The agreement is reached in period t after the third party's entry in the period 
_ t-i -
5 < 1 in favour of party i.In this case, party i,s payoff is (1 - + , 
_ t=s 
and another party's payoff is S^aj. 
8 Even though some of the payoff is not realized in any circumstance. We have to specify all the 
possible outcomes in order to have a complete description of the bargaining game. 
^In this case the agreement is affected by the third party's decision which is different from the 
previous case. 
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IV Two parties engage in perpetual disagreement, and the third party's entry, in 
favour of party i, occur in period s. The payoff of player i is then while 
that of party j is 0. 
V Two parties engage in perpetual disagreement, and the third party does not 
enter. The payoff vector is (0,0). 
Finally, everything described thus far is common knowledge among the players. 
Following Yildiz (2003,2004), we assume that there is heterogeneous prior beliefs 
instead of common prior beliefs as it is in the conventional model in economic lit-
eratures."- The negotiating parties disagree on which side the third party will offer 
his support. Each player has his own assessment about his probability of receiving 
support from the third party and believes that his belief is true while that of his op-
ponent is optimistic. If qi + 1, we say that the two parties have heterogeneous 
prior beliefs. We are particular interested in the situation in which both players are 
collectively optimistic about the future support from the third party on his side and 
therefore gi + 仍〉1. If we fix the probability of assessments, the magnitude of 
optimism also depends on the value of potential support which is d. Players could 
be optimistic about both the probability of receiving support from the third party 
and the magnitude of it. Both qi and d are the determinants of the level of opti-
mism. The measure of optimism qi + q2-l being used in Yildiz (2003,2004) is then 
inadequate to capture the meaning of optimism. To capture both parameters into 
the measurement of the level of optimism, we introduce a new measure of optimism, 
which is m (gi，92，d) = (qi q2 - 1) d}^ 
To conclude this section, we make some clarifications on the notations used to 
represent the bargaining game and subgame. Denote as {xi,x2) the interim disagree^ 
10For more information about common prior beliefs and heterogenous prior beliefs, you may refer 
to Stephen Morris (1995). 
11 Base on this measurement, we know that players will only be collectively optimistic about the 
support form the third party. Even if one of the negotiating parties may be pessimistic about the 
support on his side, they can still have collective optimism as long as the other party is sufficiently 
optimistic about the support on his side. 
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ment payoff vector. Prior to the entry of the third party, {xi.x^) is (0,0), but it 
becomes either [d, 0) or (0’ d) after the realization of E depending on which side the 
third party offers his support. Denote as G^  {xi,X2) the subgame starting with a 
decision node, at which it is player i's turn to make the offer and the disagreement 
payoff vector is {xi,x2). The whole bargaining game can be denoted as G^ (0,0). 
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4 Perfect Equilibrium with Delay 
In this section, we analyze the perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game with 
delay. By considering optimism as an outside option and using the idea of Nash 
demand game, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the delay to occur. 
Precisely, we use the following strategy to identify the required condition. In the first 
stage, we consider the waiting strategy as a threat can be taken by the players. We 
can find the expected payoffs for player 1 and 2 by waiting for the realization of the 
support from the third player. We define these expected payoffs as the security level 
payoffs. In the second stage, we compare the security level payoffs with the expected 
payoffs from making immediate agreement. If the payoff of one of the players in 
the first period is lower than the expected payoffs derived from waiting, this player 
will definitely be willing to wait instead of having immediate agreement. Waiting is 
then a credible threat. Therefore, the payoffs of both players in the equilibrium with 
immediate agreement must be at least equal to their expected payoffs derived from 
waiting. Moreover, the expected payoffs from waiting are increasing with their level 
of optimism. If both players remain highly optimistic through time, the total sum 
of the security level payoffs is greater than 1. Since they both demand for payoffs 
at least equal to the expected payoffs from waiting, they cannot have compatible 
agreement in the first period. Waiting is the only option left. 
Before we proceed, we first present the equilibrium payoffs of the bargaining game 
after the realization of the change in disagreement payoffs, namely the post-entry 
subgame. In our notation, we denote these subgames G^ {xi.x^) for {xi,x2) being 
equal to (0, d) or (d, 0) and i being equal to 1 or 2. In addition , we define the 
equilibrium outcome as a)，which represents the payoff of player j in the bargaining 
game with player i to be the proposer in the first period. 
15 
Lemma 1 Every suhgame (a：!, 0:2) has a unique subgame perfect equilihrium(SPE) 
with immediate agreement. The equilibrium agreement is: 
iO,d): = and a^ {0,d) = 
{d, 0); a； (d, 0) = d-h{l- cO击 and al (d, 0) = (1 - 击 
a? (0,d)= (1-G?)^ and 4 {0,d) = d + {1 - d)^ 
G、d, 0); a\ (d, 0) = d+{l-d)jlrs and a^ (d, 0) = (1 - d)^. 
Lemma 1 shows that there will be immediate agreement as long as the third party 
has come in and decided to support one of the negotiating parties. The interpretation 
for the immediate agreement payoffs is as the follows. The player who receives 
the support from the third party takes the payoff d first. The amount 1 - d left 
will be shared by the two players according to the Rubinstein bilateral bargaining 
game. This is referred to the "split of the difference rule" in the literatures. Before 
presenting the lemma on security level payoffs, we sketch the idea for the proof of 
the equilibrium payoff in these post-entry subgames while all the technical proofs 
are relegated to the appendix. ^ ^ We only provide detail reasoning for the subgame 
G^ (d, 0), while that of the other subgames can be obtained easily by similar argument. 
We characterize the SPE outcome of the post-entry subgame by using the tech-
nique in Shaked and Sutton (1984). Following their technique, we first define Mi 
and TTi to be the supremum and infimum equilibrium payoffs that player i obtains in 
the SPE outcome of any subgame beginning with his offer in the subgame G^ {d, 0) 
for 2 = 1,2. We then stated and proved four inequalities for Mi and rrii in claim 1 
and 2 in the appendix. After that, we find the equilibrium payoffs of the post-entry 
subgame by solving the system of inequality. 
Equipped with the four inequalities in claim 1 and 2, we can now prove lemma 
1. We split the problem into two cases depending on the relative magnitude of the 
i2Furusawa and Wen (2002) has presented the equilibrium payoffs of the game with fixed interim 
disagreement point at d = (^1,^2)- They characterize the equilibrium payoffs that satisfy the 
immediate acceptance property. Moreover, they have not given out the detail proof. Here we 
provide the detail proof by employing the method introducted by Shaked and Sutton (1984) for 
completeness. See also Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Muthoo (1999) for the arguments. 
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expected payoff from making acceptable offer and that from making unacceptable 
offer for player 1. These two cases are i) (1 - 5)d + - 5)d + Mi < 1 - 5m2 
and ii) (1 - 5)d + (5(1 - 6)d + S^Mi > 1 - Sm2. In case i, the equilibrium payoff 
of player 1 is found to be which can be restated as d + Further, the 
equilibrium payoff of player 2 is After substituting these two values back into 
the inequality in determining case i, we obtain the inequality d < I. This means that 
if the disagreement payoff d is smaller than 1, there will be immediate agreement 
for the subgame 0). The intuition is that if the value of d is small enough, 
player 2 is willing to agree on the share in which player 1 gets the amount d first 
to induce him not to make unacceptable offer or reject the proposed offer. In other 
word, player 2 is willing to compensate player 1 to have immediate agreement. They 
can have agreement in the first period of the stated subgame. 
For case 2，we get the result that player 1 has payoff d while player 2 gets 0. 
After substituting these values into the inequality in determining case ii, we obtain 
the inequality d > 1. This is also quite intuitive. If the disagreement payoff is so 
high that it is greater than 1, player 1 expects to have payoff more than 1 upon 
disagreement. He is willing to make unacceptable offer and reject any offer made by 
player 2 to enjoy the disagreement payoff. They cannot reach compatible agreement 
in any circumstance. Moreover, 0 < d < 1 by our assumption, case i is the only 
relevant case and there will be immediate agreement in the post-entry subgame. 
With the lemma 1, concerning the equilibrium payoffs in the post-entry subgame, 
we can calculate the security level payoffs for both players in lemma 2 and identify 
the necessary and sufficient condition for delay to occur and specify the perfect 
equilibrium with delay in proposition 1. 
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Lemma 2 Define k {qi,q2, d) to be the security level payoff in C^ (0’ 0) for player i 
where i 二 1，2. The explicit form for Ii (gi, g2’ d) is: 
h M ) = 知 二 2 (1 
T ! J、 + (^ V (1 - p) S2 
仍 ， = 1 —沪 
where si = qid-\- d) and si = g^c? + (1 - d) 
h (^1,^ 2, d) is the expected payoff that player i is secured to attain by refusing 
to bargain with his opponent and waiting for the realization of the support from 
the third party. Si is the expected payoff for the post-entry subgame in which it is 
player i to make the first offer before the realization of the support from the third 
party while Si is that of the post-entry subgame in which it is play j to be the 
proposer first. The security level payoff is just the present value of the stream of 
expected payoffs for the corresponding post-entry subgames before the realization 
of the support from the third party. The detail calculation for the security level is 
relegated to the appendix. For notational simplicity, we will write Ii as this security 
level payoff thereafter. Prom the expression, we can show that the total sum of the 
security level payoffs is increasing with the level of optimism. There is a continuous 
range for level of optimism to cause equilibrium with delay as long as there is a 
critical level of optimism such that the total sum of the security is 1. Proposition 1 
shows that this critical level of optimism does exist for some parameters. 
Proposition 1 The bargaining game has a unique SPE outcome, in which an agree-
ment, as specified in lemma 1, is reached immediately after the resolving of uncer-
tainties if and only if the condition pd{qi + 5-2-1) > (1 - 5) /5 is satisfied. ' 
Proof. Suppose {x, y) is the equilibrium payoff vector attained in the first period 
of the game. For subgame perfect requirement, we must have x > h and y > I2. 
13 The resolving of the uncertainty is in term of the realization of the disagreement payoff vector 
(d’0) or (0’d). 
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Otherwise, the player who gets payoff lower than /“ will simply chooses the option 
of waiting by making unacceptable offer whenever he is the proposer or rejecting any 
offer whenever he is the responder. Then if the security level payoffs are so high that 
h + h> 1, we will also have the inequality x-\-y > I. This implies that the total 
demand of both players in the first period are so high that compatible agreement 
is impossible to achieve in the first period whenever the inequality /i + /2 > 1 is 
satisfied. Moreover, we show in the appendix that the inequality ii + /之 > 1 is 
actually equivalent to the inequality pd{qi + — 1) > (1 - 5) /5. This establishes 
the fax:t that pd{qi + q2 — 1) > (1 - 5) /5 is a sufficient condition for delay to occur. 
To show that pd {qi + q2 — 1) > (1 - S) /S is a necessary condition for delay, we 
have a detail reasoning in the next section. In next section, we find the explicit 
expression for the unique equilibrium payoffs with immediate agreement. We then 
shows that the subgame perfection required that 'pd{qi + — 1) < (1 — S) /6. Then 
we can have the conclusion that if the game have delayed agreement in the equi-
librium, we must have the condition pd {qi + - 1) < (1 - 5) /S being violated. 
That is pd {qi + g2 - 1) > (1 - S) /5 is a necessary condition for delay equilibrium to 
occur. • 
Base on the above analysis we obtain the results that if p, d, and qi are large 
enough or players become patient enough such that pd {qi -{- q2 - I) > (1 - 5) 
players are optimistic about the future increase in disagreement payoff on his side 
very much. They both demand for a large share of the pie. There does not exist 
compatible agreement before the realization of the change in disagreement payoff 
vector. In this case, the unique perfect equilibrium is that the proposer always 
proposes unacceptable offer while the responder always rejects the offer from his 
opponent. In this equilibrium with delay, the equilibrium payoffs vary and depend 
on the time for the uncertainty to be resolved. Suppose the uncertainty is resolved at 
time t, the game will have immediate agreement right after the uncertainty is resolved 
by lemma 1. The player who gets the support from the third party will receive the 
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payoff d*[d-\- (l-d) as a proposer and (1 - d) j ^ ] as a responder. The 
other player will receive - d )击 as a responder and (1 - c?) ^ as a proposer. 
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5 Perfect Equilibrium with Immediate Agreement 
In this section, we concentrate on analyzing the perfect equilibrium with immediate 
agreement. In contrast with the condition for delay to occur, if p, d, and qi are small 
enough or the negotiating parties become less patient such that pd{qi q2 - I) < 
(1 - 6) /5, they are less optimistic about the future increase in disagreement payoff 
on his side. The total sum of the security levels is so low that it is smaller than 1. 
Under this circumstance, they could have compatible agreement in the first period. 
Further, the negotiating party will always make an acceptable offer whenever he is 
the proposer. Both negotiating parties could first obtain their respective security 
level payoff while the amount 1 - Ii - I2 left will be shared by them.^ '^  This is a 
form of the split of the difference rule. The bargaining game ends immediately even 
though both players are still optimistic about the future increase in disagreement 
payoff on his favour. Our proof of the equilibrium with immediate agreement involve 
using the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984). In fact, our bargaining game is 
isomorphic to game 2 in the paper of Sutton (1986). We can transform our game 
to a game with potential outside option like what appeared in Sutton's paper. We 
do the transformation by considering optimism as an outside option. First, we have 
proved in lemma 1 that there will be an immediate agreement whenever the change 
in disagreement payoff vector is realized. Moreover, before the realization of the 
support from the third party, we can calculate each player's expected payoff in the 
next period based on each player's belief. In addition, it is a notable fact that we may 
replace the extensive form subgame with the game value of that subgame as the new 
terminal node while keeping the equilibrium payoffs unchanged. The equilibrium 
strategy of the original game is just the strategy in the transformed game plus the 
strategy in the subgame after the realization of the support from the third party. 
We show in the appendix that the condition for immediate agreement i.e. pd{qi + 92 - 1) < ^ 
is equivalent to I i + I2 < 1. So 1 - - /之 > 0. 
15 This is refered to Generalized Zermelo's Principle in the literatures. For more information and 
the detail proof of the principle, you may refer to any text book in game theory. For example, Mas 
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We can then consider the expected payoff in the equilibrium of the correspondence 
post-entry subgame as the potential outside option. The situation now is that the 
players take the equilibrium payoffs of the post-entry subgame as if they were forced 
to take the outside options. This is exactly the environment described in game 2 in 
Sutton (1986). The random event corresponds to the third party's entry, and each 
player's outside option is the expected value of his equilibrium payoff in the post-
entry subgames. The only difference is that our game takes the heterogeneous prior 
belief about the change in the disagreement payoffs. Each player is optimistic about 
the increase in disagreement payoff on his side. Since the players are proposer and 
responder alternately, the outside option induced by the optimistic belief changes 
alternately between period. Moreover, it turns out that the equilibrium payoff of 
our game is not much different from what obtained in Sutton (1986). It is because 
each player uses the belief of the responder to determine the equilibrium share rather 
that his own belief. Otherwise, his opponent who has the right to reject the proposed 
share, will certainly reject the offer . Proposition 2 presents the equilibrium with 
immediate agreement J Moreover, before stating Proposition 2 formally we first 
present the lemma to show how to transform our bargaining game into the bargaining 
game with potential outside option. 
Lemma 3 The transformation of the bargaining game with collective optimism could 
be done by replacing the post-entry subgames with the expected payoffs of the corre-
sponding extensive form subgame as the new terminal node. The resulting game is the 
bargaining game with potential outside option {6si,5s2) in even period and (5si， 
in odd period, where Si = i^cJ + y：^  (1 - d) and Si = Qid + {I - d). In addition, 
the outside option is available at the beginning of the period with probability p. 
Colell A, Whinston D. and Green R.’ "Microeconomic Theory", has a formal description and detail 
proof of this principle in Proposition 9.B.3 in pg 277. 
1 吁he proof of proposition 2 also follows the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984). See also 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Muthoo (1999) for the arguments. 
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Proof. As discussed before, it is a notable fact that we can replace the extensive 
form subgame with the game value of that subgame while keeping the equilibrium 
payoff of the game unchanged. Here we argue that the potential outside option is as 
stated in the lemma. 
Suppose the random event has not realized at the beginning of the period and 
player i is the proposer in the current period. If player j rejects the offer from i, 
both players believe that there is probability p that a random event happen and third 
party decides to support one of the negotiating party at the beginning of next period. 
Base on the beliefs of the two negotiating parties on which side the support goes to, 
we can calculate what both players expect to get in the subgame G^  {xi,x2) before 
the realization of support from the third party. This is what we refer to the potential 
outside option. The potential outside option at the beginning of next period as it is 
calculated in lemma 2 is: 
Si = Qid + (1 - d) 
We can vary i to get the expected outside option in which it is player j to make 
the offer first. Then the consequent game is a bargaining game with potential outside 
option ((5?i’(5s2) in even period and ((5si，(^ i2) in odd period. The probability for 
the realization of the outside option is p. m 
Proposition 2 If pd {qi + g2 — 1) < (1 — /5, the game has a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium, which is reached immediately. In this equilibrium, player 1 always 
proposes the agreement (a；!, 1 - Xi),where Xi = i+《\—口) + "^。口丄(丄：々】:;)妒2 accepts 
any proposal y with yi > i二(/(二) + 恤 广 。 . P l a y e r 2 always proposes the 
agreement (yi, 1 — yi), where yi = i二(/(::)”) + 丄；广。，and accepts any proposal 
X with X2 > + ^  (丄;々 二;)货SI. The equilibrium outcome is reached immediately 
on (xi, 1 — rci). 
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Proof. Suppose Mi (mj be the supremum (infimum) of the equilibrium payoff of 
player i in the game (0’ 0) and the proposer uses the belief of his opponent to 
divide the pie. If player i is the current proposer, he believes that player j + i 
rejects any offer Xi such that \ - xi < 5psj + (1 -p)57nj. It is because the right 
hand side of the inequality is what player j expects to get at least by rejecting the 
offer from player i. On the other hand player i believes that player j always accept 
oci such that 1 - rr^〉Spsj + (1 - p) 5Mj due to the fact that player j expects to get 
the right hand side of the inequality at most by rejecting the offer of player i. Then 
we can have the system of inequality as the follows. 
Mi <1- 6psj - (l-p) 5mj 
< for 2, j = 1,2 
mi>l — Spsj — {1 -p) SMj 
\ 
Base on simple calculation in the appendix, we get the unique value for Mi and 
mi. 
Mi = m i = 咖，where = (1 _ 句 for z, j = 1，2 and 
For player 1 to make the equilibrium offer as it is specified in the first period, we 
must have the inequality, mi > 5psi + ^  (1 -p) (1 - 7722). Moreover, the calculation 
in the appendix shows that this is equivalent to the condition 'pd{qi + q^ — l) < 
( l “ ) / 5 . 
Furthermore, noting the fact that players 1 and 2 are expected to receive their 
security level payoffs Ii and I2 respectively by waiting for the support from the third 
party. In order for them not to take the option of waiting and obtain this security 
level payoff, the payoff in immediate agreement must be greater that this security-
level from waiting. Then we should have the conditions Ii < Xi and /2 < 1 — for 
immediate agreement. Base on the calculation in the appendix, both conditions are 
also equivalent to the delay condition pd {qi + — 1) < (1 — /S. 
All the above subgame perfection conditions require the same inequality to be 
held for immediate agreement to occur. This indicates that 5pd (g^ i + 仍—1) ：^  1 — 5 
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is a necessary and sufficient condition for the immediate agreement to occur. If there 
is agreement with delay, this condition must be violated. • 
Finally, when 5pd (gi 十仍-1) = l-(5，the players are indifferent between waiting 
and having immediate agreement. There will be two SPE outcomes, one with delay 
and one with immediate agreement. Any mixing between these two action can also 
be part of the equilibrium. Moreover, this multiplicity is rather trivial and we ignore 
this type of the equilibrium. 
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6 Efficiency Loss Caused by Optimism 
The main difference between our setting of the model and the Rubinstein bargaining 
model is that there is a third party, who may enter the game and support one of 
the negotiating parties with probability p at the beginning of each period. With this 
slight modification, there may be delay and efficiency loss in the bargaining game. 
Since the support may come only after a long period of delay, the efficiency loss could 
be arbitrary large. In the extreme, the whole pie will be eroded. 
We have shown in the previous two sections that whether there is delay in the 
game depends on the relative magnitude of 5pd (豹 + g2 - 1) and 1 — If the latter is 
greater, players agree immediately. Conversely, if the former is greater, there will be 
delay in reaching agreement, which induces efficiency loss. Prom the delay condition, 
we know that 1 - goes to 0 as J goes to 1. It is relatively easier to fall into the 
immediate agreement regime. It seems that the efficiency loss is decreasing and will 
become negligible as 5 goes to 1. It is natural to wonder whether it is really the 
case that the efficiency loss becomes negligible when the negotiating parties become 
extremely patient. The answer to this question will determine whether optimism has 
any explaining power in bargaining inefficiency. 
To answer this question, we first suppose D is the duration for the persistence 
of optimism in the game. Then the efficiency loss of the bargaining game is equal 
to 1 - Since the duration for persistence of the optimism is indeterministic and 
D is stochastic, we do not know the exact value for the efficiency loss exant. What 
we can do is to calculate the expected efficiency loss caused by optimism. Due to 
our stationary assumption on the probability for the realization of the event E, it 
is expected that the duration for the persistence of optimism is 1/p whenever the 
support from third party has not yet realized before. The expected loss of efficiency 
is equal to 1 - The expected efficiency loss is decreasing with p for a particular 
value of S. This result is quite intuitive. If both player expect the probability for the 
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realization of E is high, they expect the uncertainty to be resolved in the near future. 
That means that they expect that there is agreement on sharing of the surplus in the 
near future. The expected efficiency loss is then smaller. Prom the explicit form of 
the efficiency loss, it depends on the value of p. If p is determined, we determine the 
expected efficiency loss of the bargaining game too. Moreover, p is exogenous in our 
model and we do not know the expected efficiency loss before having the value for 
P' What we can do is to find a fairly strict upper bound for the expected efficiency 
loss. 
We actually show that the upper bound for efficiency loss is approximately equal 
tod{qi + - 1), which is defined to be the level of optimism. This limiting value is 
achieved as the players become extremely patient. We summarized these results in 
proposition 3 and sketch the main ideas for the proof. We also provide some intuitive 
interpretations of this result while the technical proof is relegated to the appendix. 
Proposition 3 The supremum of the expected efficiency loss L{5) is increasing to 
1 — exp (—m) as the discount factor 5 goes to 1. 
Recall the delay condition is 6pd {qi + q2 - I) > 1 — S, the infimum p to cause 
delay in the bargaining game is decreasing with the discount factor S. In addition, 
note that is increasing with p if (5 remain constant. That means that the effi-
ciency loss will become larger for a particular discount factor as p becomes smaller. 
Nevertheless, 5 is actually increasing to 1. This contributes to the increasing value 
of (Ji/P and decreasing efficiency loss if we hold p unchanged. Then there are two 
counter interactive forces to determine whether the upper bound for the efficiency 
loss is decreasing or increasing with 5. To find the net effect，we have to calculate 
the explicit form of the upper bound. We first define p*^" to be the critical value of 
P such that 5p*d + g2 _ 1) = 1 — (^ .Then any p greater than p* will cause delay 
in the bargaining game. That is if we fix m〉0，for any sufficient high value of S, 
"This p* may not be bounded by (0’ 1). So it may not be interpreted as probability value. 
Moreover p* e (0’ 1) is true for sufficient large value of discount factor and high level of optimism. 
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there exist p € ( p*, 1], the unique equilibrium outcome involves \/p periods of delay. 
The upper bound for the expected efficiency loss is then equal to 1 一 <5杀，which is 
defined to be L ⑷ . I t follows that L ⑷ is equal to 1 - i ) . ^ ^ ^how in the 
appendix that L (^) is actually increasing to 1 - e—辦们+92-1) from below as 5 tends 
to 1. By Taylor expansion, we may approximate by 1 - c? + gg - 1) 
for sufficient small value of d and qi. The expected upper bound for efficiency loss 
increases to d(qi + q2-l) approximately from below as the discount rate goes to 1. 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the upper bound for the expected efficiency loss against 5 
for the level of optimism equal 0.01 and 0.1 respectively. Prom the figures, the ap-
proximation in the case with optimism level 0.01 is much better than that when the 
optimism level is 0.1. The efficiency loss is caused by the willingness of the players 
to wait for the benefit of possible changes in disagreement payoffs to d. The higher 
value of the discount rate, the more patient is the players. They are then more 
willing to wait for the realization of the future benefit as they become more patient. 
The expected efficiency loss in this waiting behavior increases accordingly when the 
willingness of the players to wait increases. Moreover the expected upper bound 
for the efficiency loss can be approximated by d{qi + q2- 1). We may interpret 
d(qi + - 1) as the expected amount in excess of the actual support d offered by 
the third party. This excess amount is actually generated by the collective optimism 
of the players. Both players would like to wait for the realization of the support 
from the third party on his side. This waiting behavior will generate efficiency loss. 
The maximum expected amount wasted in the equilibrium with waiting equals this 
excess amount approximately. This is consistent with the basic economic intuition 
that the expected maximum amount dissipated in the rent seeking activities is the 
future benefit can be derived. Here the possible future benefit of support from third 
party may be wasted by delaying the agreement. 
Another interesting result is to compare the upper bound for the loss of efficiency 
L (S) in the limiting case with the perceived surplus d(qi -h q2 - 1) generated by the 
28 
0.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1——p： 
0 . 0 0 9 - -
0,008 - ^ ^ -
0 . 0 0 7 - -
0.006 - -
-1 0 . 0 0 5 • Z -
0 . 0 0 4 • z ‘ 
0 . 0 0 3 - / -
0.002 - / -
0.001 - -
n I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0.1 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 6 0 . 7 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 
delta 
Figure 2: The maximum loss of efficiency when d{qi + - 1) = 0.01 
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Figure 3: The maximum loss of efficiency when d {qi + q^ - 1) = 0.1 
29 
1 I I 1 1 1 1 E 1 7 
~ - L=1-exp(-d) z 
0.9 - — — L = d -
0 , 8 - -
0 .7 - z Z -
0.6 - , Z 
0.2- Z -
0 . 1 - -
n L'' I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
• 0 1 0.2 0 3 0 4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
d 
Figure 4: Upper bound for the efficiency loss and perceived surplus 
optimism. We know that 1 - e—彻i+卯—i) is always smaller than d{qi + q2 - 1). 
Figure 4 depicts these two functions with the assumptions that q^  = q2 = 1. It 
is clear from the figure that the upper bound for the expected efficiency loss is 
always smaller than the perceived surplus generated by collective optimism of the 
negotiating parties. The intuition is that the maximum loss of efficiency should 
not be greater than the perceived future surplus in order to achieve exant efficiency 
in the bargaining. Moreover, for low level of optimism, the upper bound for the 
limiting loss of efficiency is approximated well by the perceived surplus generated 
while the difference between the loss of efficiency becomes larger as the level of 
optimism become higher and higher. We may interpret the result as, for relatively 
lower level of optimism, players have a more accurate perception of the expected 
surplus generated by collective optimism. They are expected to wait until the whole 
surplus is dissipated. Moreover, as the level of optimism become higher and higher, 
they have higher and higher mis-perception about the expected surplus from waiting. 
Then the difference between the upper bound for the expected efficiency loss and 
the perceived surplus generated by collective optimism become larger as the level of 
optimism become higher. 
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7 Discussions 
This thesis intends to re-examine Yildiz's important insights about the role of op-
timism in bargaining. Our model suggests the inequality pm (gi，g2, cQ < (1 — /5 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium with immedi-
ate agreement. The term 5pm (gi,仍,d) can be interpreted as the perceived surplus 
generated by collective optimism for delaying the game from period t tot + 1. Then 
S'pm (g i ,仍’ d)-\-S is the perceived size of the pie by delaying the bargaining game for 
one period. If the size of the perceived pie is smaller than 1, the perceived surplus 
generated by the collective optimism is not enough to compensate the share of pie 
eroded by delaying the agreement to next period. It is not beneficial for the play-
ers to delay the agreement. So they would have immediate agreement rather than 
agreement with delay. In contrast, if the perceived size of the pie is larger than 1, 
they will simply delay the game to enjoy the expected increase in the total size of 
the pie due to the support from the third party. 
The condition also suggests that both the probability for the realization of the 
random event E and the level of optimism are the determinants of the timing for 
agreement. For any particular level of optimism, the condition for immediate agree-
ment will be satisfied for for sufficient small p. Moreover 1/p is just the expected 
duration for the existence of uncertainty in the game. The smaller p implies that 
the longer expected duration for the uncertainty to last. This implies that the 
negotiating parties agree immediately whenever they expect the duration of uncer-
tainty persisting for sufficient long period of time. This result is consistent with 
Yildiz's Immediate Agreement Theorem. Nevertheless, we are also keen on other 
side of the story. Optimism can be an explanation for efficiency loss in bargaining 
when it is not so persistent. In our model, the probability of realization of the ran-
dom event E is exogenous. For a particular not very small p, the delay condition 
pm {qi,q2, d) > (1 — 5) jd will be satisfied for sufficient high level of optimism. The 
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result suggests a clear idea that excessive optimism can yield delay in the bargain-
ing while excessive optimism for sufficient long period of time will yield immediate 
agreement on the division of the surplus. 
Our model provides a more intuitive explanation for the incentive for the player to 
delay the agreement. Players' willingness to wait is determined by their belief on the 
future resolving of uncertainty on his favour. They believe that there is a third party 
to support him sometime in the future. If such expectation is high, they then are 
willing to wait for the realization of the future benefit. There will be efficiency loss 
due to the waiting behavior of the players. The incentive for the waiting behavior in 
our model is the same as that in Avery and Zemsky (1994). Players wait because they 
expect to get more in the near future period. This waiting behavior is efficient exant. 
It is because player only prefer waiting to having immediate agreement whenever 
they can have higher expected payoffs by waiting. Moreover there will be immediate 
agreement right after the realization of the support from the third party. None of 
the two parties receive this disagreement payoffs from the third party but the pie is 
shrinking through time. Then the discounted total pie at the time for agreement is 
smaller than the original pie. There is efficiency loss expost. 
32 
8 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, we follow Yildiz (2003) to study a bargaining model with heteroge-
neous prior belief. We assume that both players are optimistic about the future 
increase in his disagreement payoff. We show that, under this framework, excessive 
optimism alone may not cause delay in the bargaining game. Whether the game 
have immediate agreement depends on both the probability of support from the 
third party and the level of optimism of the players. If the probability of the support 
from the third party is extremely small, the game will have immediate agreement 
even though the players remain excessive optimism through time. This result is in 
the same spirit with the Immediate Agreement Theorem of Yildiz (2003). However, 
if the probability of the support from the third party is in medium level, there exist 
a critical level of optimism in which any optimism level larger will cause delay while 
any optimism smaller will give out immediate agreement. Lastly, if the probability 
of the support from the third party is very large, then there will be delay even for low 
level of optimism. But the conclusion that there is immediate agreement whenever 
the level of uncertainty is expected to last for sufficient long time is generally true. 
Yildiz's result is robust in our definition of the optimism. Above all, we specify the 
equilibrium payoffs of the bargaining game. We also find a fairly strict upper bound 
for the expected efficiency loss and show that this efficiency loss does not disappear 
even though the negotiating parties become extremely patient. 
This thesis is a first step to test the Immediate Agreement Theorem in the en-
vironment in which players are optimistic about the future support from the third 
party. Prom technical point of view, it is interesting to ask the following questions: 
What is the delay condition when the support may realize more than once or when 
the probability for the realization of the support follows a more general distribution, 
for instance an exponential distribution, rather than remain constant. 
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9 Appendix 
Claim 1 Ml < max{(l — 6)d + 5(1 - 5)d + Mi, 1 - ^ms} 
mi > max{((l - S)d + 5(1 - S)d + 1 — 6M2} 
Proof. Player 1 has options to make acceptable offer to enjoy the agreed share of 
the pie or make unacceptable offer to enjoy the disagreement payoffs in the current 
period and the possible agreement in the next period. 
If player 1 makes an unacceptable offer, he collects the disagreement payoff d 
first and then the game will proceed to a new subgame with player 2 becomes the 
proposer. Player 2 will not offer more than (^ (1 - 5)d + to player 1. It is 
because the best player 1 can do after rejecting the offer from player 2 is to collect 
disagreement payoff d and get Mi at most in the next period. The discounted payoff 
for rejecting the offer from player 2 is at most 5{l-6)d-\-5'^Mi. Then the equilibrium 
payoff of player 1 at the beginning of the game by making unacceptable offer cannot 
exceed (1 — 5)d + (5(1 — 5)d + Mi. In addition, player 1 will reject any offer with 
discounted payoff smaller than 5(1 — 5)d + 5'^mi in next period. It is because this 
is the minimum amount player 1 can get by rejecting the offer from player 2. Then 
player 1 can get {l-S)d-{-5{l-5)d+5^miait least by making unacceptable offer. The 
equilibrium payoff of player 1 cannot be greater than (1 - + - 6)d + 沪Mi and 
be smaller than (1 — S)d + (5(1 — S)d + 5'^mi. 
Alternatively, if player 1 makes an acceptable offer. Payer 2 will certainly reject 
any offer smaller than 5m<2 and accept any offer greater than 5M2. It is because 
player 2 can get 7712 at least and M2 at most by rejecting the offer from player 1 and 
proceed the game to next period. Then player 1 can get at most 1 — §1712 and at 
least 1 — 6M2 by making an acceptable offer. 
Player 1 compares these two options and chooses the one with higher payoff. This 
establishes the claim 1 above. • 
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Claim 2 M2 < 1 - {1 - 5)d - 5mi 
m2>l-(l-S)d- 5Mi 
Proof. Player 2 also has options to make acceptable or unacceptable offer in the 
subgame in which he is the proposer. Moreover, the only difference now is that 
player 2 will get 0 in case there is disagreement in the game. Using the similar 
analysis as in the proof of claim 1, the continuation value by making unacceptable 
and reject the offer by another player become S^ M2 at most and at least. 
Besides player 1 will certainly reject any offer smaller than (1 - 5)d + 5miSiiid accept 
any offer greater than (1 - 6)d + 5Mi by making acceptable offer. Player 2 will then 
compare the payoff of making acceptable offer with that in making unacceptable 
offer. Then we have two equations M2 < mdix{5^M2, l - ( l - 5 ) d - 5mi} and m) > 
ma,x{5'^m2,l-(l-S)d-5Mi}. We claim that max{(5^Mi, 1-(1-S)d-Smi} equals 
1 - (1 - S)d — 5mi. Otherwise M^ < 5'^M2 which implies that M2 < 0. Since player 
2 can ensure a payoff 0 by perpetually rejecting the offer from player 1 and making 
unacceptable, M2 < 0 is impossible. In addition, player 2 can offer 5 to player land 
get 1 — 5, which is certainly accepted due to the fact that player 1 can get at most 
5 if the game is delayed to next period. Then M2 = 0 is also not an equilibrium 
payoff. This establishes the inequality M2 < 1 - (1 - 5)d-5mi. On the other hand, 
we must have 7712 > 1 — (1 — S)d — 5Mi. It is because m2 > S'^m2 implies m2 > 0 
which must true for player 2 can secure payoff 0 from perpetual disagreement. The 
arguments above establish the two inequalities in claim 2. • 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Case i) (1 — 5)d + 5(1 - 5)d + 6'^Mi < 1 - Sm2 
The system of inequality becomes 
Ml < 1 - 5m2 
mi>l- 5M2 
M2<l-il-5)d- 5mi 
、 ' m 2 > l - ( l - 5 ) d - 6 M i 
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Ml < 1 - - (1 - 5)d - 5Mi] 
mi > 1 - (5[1 - (1 - S)d - 5mi] 
M2<l-(l-S)d- ^(1 — SM2) 
m2 > 1 - (1 - S) - S(1 - 61712) 
< 
' M i S 错 
m i 〉 迎 
' - i+d 
In addition, Mi > mi and M2 > m2. 
I M2 =爪2 = 结 
Now, we can substitute the value of Mi and mi back into the inequality to 
determine the case i. 
We get + + 
<^(1- 5、d + 5{1 - + 5'' + 5^d<1^5-6 + 5d 
^d-S^d + 6^ <l 
Case ii) (1 — 5)d + 5{1 - 6)d + 沪Mi > 1 - 5m2 
The system of inequality becomes 
M l < (1 - 5)d + 5{1 — 5)d + 
m i > (1 - S)d + 5(1 - 5)d + S^mi 
< 
M2<1-(l-5)d- 5mi 
、 > 1 - {l-5)d-6Mi 
Mi=mi = d 
M2= 1712=0 
\ 
We can substitute these value back into the inequality to get d> 1. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. 
Denote Si and Si the expected payoff of player i in the subgame in which he is 
the proposer and proposer respectively at the beginning of the period and before the 
realization of the support . The expected value of Si and Si base on the belief of 
player z is as the follows. 
Si = qAd+{l - TTj] + (1 -明）(1 - TTJ 
With these expected level of payoffs in each period before the realization of the 
support from the third party, we can derive the explicit form for the security level 
of payoffs. 
l2 = 5pS2 + - V)S2 + - pf S2 + - pfs2 + ... 
_ 5pS2+5'^p{l-p)S2 
- 1 一 < 5 2 ( 1 一 p 尸 • 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
h + h> I 
^ 十 一p)：/ 7 
where si = qid+ d) and Si = g^c? + j^j (1 - d) 
> 1 “ 2 ( 1 1 ) 2 
5pd {qi + 仍 — 1 ) + 5'^p ( 1 — p ) d + 仍 - 1 ) 〉 1 - - + 炉p 
^ Spd {qi + - 1) [1 + - M > (1 - (1 + - 5p) 
Spd{qi-\-q2 - 1) >1-6 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
The appendix below solve the system of inequality to calculate equilibrium payoff 
with immediate agreement. Furthermore, we show that subgame perfection requires 
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the inequality pd {qi + g2 — 1) S (1 — 
For i = 1,2, by using the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984), we have the 
following two inequalities. 
Mi<l- 5psj - (^ (1 -p) [1 - 5psi - {1-p) 6Mi\ 
分 风 2 i-sHi-pf 
m i > l - 6psj - ^ (1 -p) [1 - 5psi - (1-p) Sirii] 
、1 -6p3i-d{l-p)+6^p{l-p)si 
i-sHi-pf 
The above result combines with the inequality that Mi > rrii, we have 
Mi -爪i - i-sHi-pf 
where si =沾d + (1 — d) for z, j = 1,2 and i + j. 
For player 1 to make the offer x = Mi = rrii in the first period, we must have 
the inequality, 
mi > 6psi -\-5{l -p){l-爪2) 
分 1 - 6ps2 -5{l-p) + 5'^p (1 一 p) Si 
> SpJi [1 pf] +6 (1 - p) [Spsi + 5(l-p)-Pp (1 -p) S2- (1 - pf 
^l-5{l-p)-6^{l-pf[l-5{l- p)] 
> SpS2 + Sph -S^p( l- p f Si - (1 - p f S2 
^[1-5(1- p)] [1 -5^(1- pf] > 5p (?i + S2) [1 -沪(1 — pf] 
^l-S-5p>5p 击{l-d) + (1 - d)_ 
1 - 6 - 6p > 6pll + {qi + q2 - I) d] 
^pd(qi+q2-l)<(l-S)/S 
In addition, pd {qi + q2 — I) < (1 — 6) /5 implies that the outside option gener-
ated by the collective optimism will not be taken by the players. 
h < 
分 6pq,d + + 5'p (1 - p) qid + 5'p (l-p)f^ 
< 1 — 5ps2 - (5(1 -p) + (1 - p) Si 
^ Spd {qi ^ q2) + 5p{l - d) < 1 - S + 5p 
^ Spd iqi+q2-l) <1-6 
38 
h<l-Xi 
< 5ps2 -{- S (I - p) - S^p(l - p) Si - S^ (1 - pf 
^5^p{l-p)d(qi+q2) + S^p(l-p){l-d)<S-Sp-S^(l-2p + p^) 
^ S^p{l - p) d(qi + q2 - I) < 6 - Sp - + 5'^p 
^ (1 - p) d (qi + q2 - I) < {6-5'') {I-p) 
分 5pd {qi+q2-l) <l-S 
All the above calculations suggest that 5pd {qi + g2 — 1) < 1 — is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the equilibrium with immediate agreement to occur. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
We show below the limiting value for the upper bound of efficiency loss. 
pd(qi + q2-l)> il-5)/S 
= l / p < 叫仍 1 二2-1) 
分 l im^VP > = 收-1) 
1 <5—1 
分 1 - < 1 - e — • 切 2 - 1 ) 
(J—1 
^ l - [ l - d ( g i + g 2 - l ) ] 
=d(qi + q2 — 1) for small enough d and qi. 
Equivalently, this limiting value is also that can be obtained when the time 
interval between the offers shrink to 0. 
Suppose the time interval is A. 
Note that when A is extremely small, 6 = — rA. 
. . . = H m e - ^ / ^ > H m e - ^ ^ ' ^ ' ^ 
A—0 A-»0 
= l im (I + 1)2/(-収<?1+92-1) 
y—oo、 y) 
= l i m (1 - r A ) - 彻 1+卯-1) 
A—0 ^ ) 
=e-彻 1+92-1)，where y =法. 
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A—0 
=d{qi + q^ — 1) for small enough d and qi. 
This establishes the equivalence between these two interpretations in the limiting 
case. 
We show below that the expected efficiency loss is increasing with discount factor. 
Recall the condition for the delay to occur which is 5pd (gi + - 1) > 1 -
Suppose p* is the value such that 6p*d {qi + q2 — I) = I — S. This p* is the critical 
value in which any p greater than p* will cause delay in the bargaining game. Define 
the upper bound for the expected efficiency loss by L{S). It follows that 
let :r = 
1 — 0 
Differentiate both sides with respect to 5 
idx _ I — d{qi+q2-l) / i , InJ \ ^ n 
xd6 — 1-6 十 (1-<J尸 — 1-S 上十 、U 
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